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Stop the execution ofTimzar Zubil! 
Timzar Zubil, a journalist and Muslim activist in North Sumatra, 
is to be executed "in the near future", according to a statement 
by the head of the North Sumatra Higher Prosecutor's Office, 
Mr. Hasan Kartomihardjo, and published in the Jakarta daily, 
Merdeka, on 15th February, 1983. 
Timzar Zubil was tried in 1978 under the 1963 Anti-
Subversion Law "for acts against the state" and for upholding 
Islamic law which is seen as a betrayal of the state dogma of 
Panca Sila (the Five Principles). He was accused of being the 
leader of a discussion group which was said to be linked to a 
"North Sumatra War Command" although witnesses at his trial 
as well as the defendant denied that any such "command" 
existed. 
News that clemency was turned down and his death sentence 
upheld by the President was reported more than a year ago in 
Tempo (20th February, 1982) . Later, the British Foreign office 
checked this report at the request of T APOL and confirmed in a 
letter to TAPOL (28th October, 1982) that it was true. 
Procedural Irregularities 
1. The defendant was not allowed to appoint his own defence 
lawyers; the lawyers who defended him were court appointees. 
(Tempo, 20th February, 1982) 
2. The defendant was not willing to accept the jurisdiction of the 
court, and refused to comply with the appeals procedure . His 
Timzar Zu is tria in f978 (Plioto: Tempo 
lawyers, against his wishes, appealed to the President for 
clemency and this was rejected. 
3. Zubil's family then requested the help of the Legal Aid 
Institute in Jakarta (LBH), complaining that the President's 
rejection was premature since prior appeals procedure had not 
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EDITORIAL 
The Army steam-rollers the MPR 
This year's session of the MPR . Indonesia's upper chamber. was 
a non-event. This is hardly surprising considering its compos-
ition plus the fact that all decisions had been finalised in advance 
so as " to avoid fierce and sensational debates during the actual 
session", according to one Jakarta newspaper (see page 4) . 
There was never any chance that disagreement could arise. that 
voting could take place. still less that some members might stage 
a walkout as happened in 1978 when Muslim party (PPP) 
members protested against the compulsory enforcement of 
Panca Sila indoctrination . This time the PPP members meekly 
voted away the,ir own right to uphold their own religious 
principles . 
subjected to political surveillance . Workers. faced with mass dis-
missals and falling wages. confront intensified military inter-
vention when they defend their right to demand better 
conditions; KOPKAMTIB has now se t up "detection .. or '"early 
detection" teams in so-called strategic areas (where foreign in-
vestment is high) in order to forestall industrial disputes . 
Peasants confront intimidation by military forces if they refuse to 
abandon their land rights. Lawyers must contend with the same 
intimidatory powers if they give legal assistance to people whose 
rights have been abused. 
But the session was also a non-event because of the absence 
of any public debate and criticism. let alone protest. at the 
steam-rollering of the session by the military. This· is a measure 
of the extent to which milit arisation and repression have now 
gone in Indonesia. Students have not only lost their right to 
organise on campus; anyone wanting to go to university must 
first give a written undertaking not to engage in political activity . 
Even children in school. as we report in this issue. arc now being 
As the impact of the world recession hits the Indonesian eco-
nomy more severely. the Suharto government will try to tackle 
the crisis by lowering living standards. This can only mean that 
the level of repression will increase as those who are hardest hit 
attempt to fight back. The army and KOPKAMTIB are better 
placed than ever to use any means to deal with protest. now that 
Indonesia's brand of militarisation - the dwi fungsi (the 
military\ ··ctual function" in social as well as defence matters) 
has been legalised and given permanence . (Basic Law on 
Defence and Security, Law No. 20, 1982.) 
Readers' letters 
The RMS question 
In TAPOL Bulletin No.55 Mr. Klemens 
Ludwig reacted to a report regarding South 
Moluccans in Bulletin No .54 (p .21). An 
Editor's Note in No .55 rightly points out 
that the Dutch Indonesia Committee was 
not responsible for the formulations 
regarding the RMS movement in No. 54. 
However, this does not imply that I, a 
member of the Dutch Committee (writing 
on my own responsibility) can agree with 
Mr . Ludwig's way of presenting the 
historical background of the 'Republic of 
the South Moluccas' (RMS). 
When on 25th April 1950 a 'Republic of 
the South Moluccas ' was proclaimed in 
Ambon, the Linggadjati Agreement of 
1946/47 to which Mr. Ludwig refers was no 
longer in force. Moreover, the Agreement 
had never been applicable to East 
Indonesia; the Moluccas had become, in 
1946, part of the newly created State of 
East Indonesia . Consequently, the legality 
of the Ambon proclamation had to be 
judged on the basis of the Treaty 
concluded in The Hague at the Round 
Table Conference of 1949 . According to 
the provisions of this Treaty, any of the 
states incorporated in the Republic of the 
United States of Indonesia , of which East 
Indonesia was one, was entitled to secede 
from the federation . But such a right of 
secession had not been granted to part of 
such a state . In April 1950, the state of 
East Indonesia was still in existence; but it 
was expected at that time that the 
Parliament of East Indonesia would decide 
to join the Rep!lblic of Indonesia , which 
actually occurred a few months later. 
Therefore, even if the wish to stay out 
of the overall state structure could be 
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interpreted as being rooted in the political 
aspirations of a majority of the South 
Moluccan population at that time - which 
is not at all certain in view of the large 
number of Muslims among the Ambonese 
- the legal basis for the proclamation of 
the RMS remained shaky . 
It is certainly true, as Bulletin No.54 
writes , that South Moluccan separatism 
(which is a correct termf) was actively 
supported by Dutch right-wing colonialist 
elements. Not only did Dr. Chr. Soumokil, 
leader of the RMS, have strong support 
from some officers in the Dutch Armed 
Forces at the time when he issued his 
proclamation; the RMS also received 
strong support in the Netherlands from 
anti-Sukarno elements concentrated in a 
foundation called Door Eeuwen Trouw 
('Faithful through the Centuries', referring 
to the loyalties of Ambonese through the 
centuries to the Crown of the 
Netherlands) . These right-wing elements 
had from the start opposed the Republic of 
Indonesia ruled by Sukarno. However, 
recognition of the freedom of Indonesia 
won a two-thirds majority in the Dutch 
Parliament, and consequently the Dutch 
government attempted to build good 
relationships with the newly created 
Indonesian state . 
The way the demobilised Moluccan 
military people were treated after their 
arrival in the Netherlands (it seems that 
they had not even been told before their 
embarkment that they would lose their 
military status!) is certainly a shameful 
story and might explain a lot about the bad 
feelings towards the Dutch in the course of 
time. It is untrue, however, that it was the 
Dutch who rejected the wish of these 
Ambonese to go home . It was the 
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Indonesian government which was only 
prepared to receive these Moluccans as 
individuals accepting a position as citizens 
of the Indonesian state. 
In the course of time , as a consequence 
of Sukarno's moderate policies towards 
opponents who had initially supported 
RMS, popular support for the RMS in the 
Moluccas decreased; the RMS finally 
became a movement which found its main 
support among Moluccans in the 
Netherlands though it has never achieved 
international recognition of any 
significance. 
At present, there is certainly opposition 
to the Suharto regime in the Moluccas; 
after all it was Suharto who, in 1966, soon 
after his actual accession to power, had the 
leader of the RMS rebels, Dr. Soumokil, 
executed. But the present popular 
opposition in the Moluccas is not basically 
different from the opposition in most of 
Indonesia. 
As has been correctly pointed out in 
Bulletin No.54, the group to which the 
Moluccans who were tried by the court in 
Assen belong (the appeal court in 
Leeuwarden has fortunately acquitted the 
whole group), have understood this and 
therefore no longer support the RMS idea, 
but oppose the Suharto regime in solidarity 
with other anti-Suharto groups . Of course, 
the issue of regional autonomy remains a 
moot one to be decided in the future in a 
democratic way. 
W.F. Wertheim 
Emeritus Professor of Southeast Asian 
History at the University of Amsterdam. 
Wageningen, Holland. 
For more readers' letters, 
please turn to -page J 3 
Militarisation digs deeper as 
general becomes vice-presi<ient 
The choice of General Umar Wirahadikusumo as Indonesia's vice-president for 1983/ 
1988 is but a sign of how far the process of militarisation has gone in Indonesia . Any 
pretence for retaining a figure-head role for civilians at the top executive level has been 
abandoned. It may also signal too that the vice-presidency has ceased to be a figure-head 
position , for the present occupant, a devout Suharto man, will either be Suharto 's 
successor or the man who oversees a "safe" succession in the case of Suharto's death . 
General Umar is the most senior of 
Indonesia's generals after General 
Nasution and General Suharto. He is 
described by Tempo (5th March 1983) as 
the man who was "the closest person to 
Suharto , the first one to support him" in 
crushing the Communist Party (PKI) 
following the 30th September events in 
1965 . He was then military commander of 
the Jakarta command , and was the first 
provincial commander to order the 
suspension of activities of the PKI and its 
associated mass organisations in his region 
of command, on 18th October 1965. Less 
than two months later, well before Suharto 
had taken over the powers of the 
presidency on 11th March 1966 and banned 
the PKI nationwide, General Umar 
imposed his own ban in Jakarta . 
At the beginning of December 1965 , 
Umar took over from Suharto as 
Commander of KOSTRAD , the strategic 
command, the pos1t10n from which 
Suharto launched his own takeover of 
power and initiated the slaughter and 
round-up of millions of people in the last 
quarter of the year. Umar later 
collaborated with General Ali Murtopo in 
reversing Indonesia's policy of 
confrontation with Malaysia, which was at 
the time a "secret" operation. After 
holding the position of Army Deputy-
Commander for two years , he was 
appointed Army Commander in 1969 and 
remained in that position until 1973. It was 
then that he was "retired" from active 
service and appointed Head of the State 
Auditing Board . 
Like Suharto. Umar first joined military 
service during the days of the Japanese 
occupation and became a local commander 
of the Japanese-created Peta in 
Tasikmalaya. After independence in 1945 
and until his appointment as a senior 
officer at the Jakarta garrison , Umar 
served consistently with the Siliwangi 
(West Java) Division , and played an active 
part in Siliwangi's operations against the 
PKI during the Madiun (Central Java) 
affa ir in 1948. He therefore has a long 
history of participation in the Indonesian 
Army's operations to crush communism. 
Mr "Clean" 
Indonesian press comments about Umar 
since his unexpected emergence as 
Suharto's team-mate have eulogised him as 
efficient , "clean" and a man of few words . 
No on~ . publicly at least , has drawn 
attention to the fact th at during his tenure 
as the country's chief auditor for the last 
ten years, corruption in the state apparatus 
has grown steadily worse . 
To provide an appearance of his 
appointment as being a democratic choice , 
the formal proposal for Umar's 
appointment was made by the three 
military-support groups in the MPR, the 
Golkar , Armed Forces and regional 
(presidential) appointees' groups . These 
groups together control 83 per cent of the 
920 seats in the MPR. 
Source fo r hiographical da1a: Tempo, 5th March 
1983. 
mar installs General Poniman as Jakarta 
commander. Poniman is now Minister for 
Defence and Security. 
" .. . it's not a Parliament, just 
a government department" 
A few weeks before the M PR assembled to elect the President and Vice-President and adopt 
a host of new decisions about state policy, all unanimously of course, a Jakarta weekly, 
Topik carried a cover story revealing a few home truths about Indonesia 's two "legislative" 
organs. We summarise the article below: 
Members of Indonesia's newly constituted 
Parliament are now describing the body as 
a "government department", nothing more 
than a part of the executive. The word 
"dewan" in its title (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat) , some of them are saying, should 
be changed to "departemen" . 
The cause of their cynicism is the new 
regime imposed on the legislature since 
General Amir Machmud, ex-Minister of the 
Interior , was appointed Chairman of the 
DPR after the general elections last year. 1 
Topik quotes DPR members from the 
non-governmental parties, PPP (Muslim) 
and POI (Nationalist and Christian) as 
complaining bitterly about the 
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bureaucratic control to which their groups 
are being subjected by the DPR's 
Secretary-General who has taken it upon 
himself to issue instructions to various 
DPR consultative bodies , to check the 
attendance records of members (by rights , 
the prerogative of the groups represented 
in the DPR) , and to insist that secretarial 
staff allocated to help the groups report to 
him about everything they are required to 
do . 
The Topik report however takes the 
issue beyond that of DPR members 
complaining about bureaucratic abuse. It 
also discusses the more fundamental 
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problem of the DPR's compos1t1on, and 
quotes an academic, Jimmly AS as saying 
that the DPR is fa r more a voice of those in 
power than of the people whom it is 
supposed to represent. "The fact is that the 
membership is determined chiefly by those 
in power," which applies to the ones who 
are elected as well as the ones who are 
appointed, he says. "Parliament has 
become powerless because of the 
quiescence (mlempemnya) of the parties." 
This is shown by the fact that the choice of 
party candidates for the elections is in the 
hands of the executive . (All lists must first 
be screened by the government.) 
Another point brought out in the Topik 
report is that , under its new chairman , the 
DPR is simply a tool of the executive . 
"Decisions taken by the chairman become 
decisions of the DPR," complained one 
lawyer quoted by the journal , whereas 
according to the rules , DPR decisions 
should only be reached after consultation 
between the groups within it . 
Mulya Lubis: DPR Members Have No 
Independence 
Mulya Lubis, a director of the Jakarta 
Legal Aid Institute , described the DPR, in 
the Topik report, as nothing more than the 
extended arm of the executive. Its budget 
preroga tive, fo r ins tance, had become the 
sole monopoly of the executive. Nor does 
the DPR exercise any control over the use 
of public funds. Visits of inspection by its 
members, to the regions, to prisons and so 
on, "are nothing more than tourist jaunts," 
he sa id . 
As for the members themselves , the 
only people appointed are those who are 
close to . or considered in a fa vourable light 
by, the men in power. This applies too to 
the ones elected at the general elections. 
"Are these people truly elected by the 
people? Don't close your eyes to the 
facts! " Lubis described DPR members as 
"parrots, yesmen, like birds in a cage . 
They can jabber a lot but they have no 
free'dom ." 
The Controllers Controlled by the 
Government 
Topik also draws attention to the fact that 
the vast majority of the members of the 
higher legislative chamber, the MPR, are 
in fact appointed by the government. 
" Initially, this was supposed to be 
temporary, but it has now become a 
fixture ." So we are in the ludicrous 
situation , the weekly goes on, where the 
President appoints the members of the 
MPR and then the MPR appoints the 
President. "The MPR and the DPR have 
been completely tamed because both 
bodies are dominated by Golkar and the 
Armed Forces .. . The very thought of 
anyone voicing the aspirations of the 
people becomes (for them) a psychological 
burden ." 
It is becoming more and more obvious that 
the legislature is being dictated to ... The 
executive simply goes ahead and does just 
what it likes , then asks the legislature for a 
stamp of approval. The roles have been 
reversed. The ones who should be doing the 
controlling are the ones who are being 
controlled. 
(I) In dissident circles in Jakarta , Amir 
Machmud's appointment is seen as a move 
to halt the tendency , established over the 
past few years, for workers hamstrung in 
their labour disputes and peasants involved 
in land disputes to take their complaints to 
Parliament as a way of airing and publicising 
their grievances . The previous chairman , 
Daryatmo, also a military man , was at least 
amenable to such approaches . Amir 
Machmud by contrast is one of the most 
hawkish of the generals in power. 
Parties must give up politics 
The two non-governmental political parties in Indonesia lost 
whatever meaning they had retained under "Panca Sita demo-
cracy" by decisions adopted by the MPR (the upper chamber) in 
its 1983 session in March this year. The main onslaught against 
the last vestiges of their existence as political parties came in the 
form of a decision requiring all political parties to have only one 
political creed, the Panca Sita . This means that the PPP may no 
longer propagate Islamic ideals , nor may the POI pursue what-
ever tattered form of nationalism it has tried to cling to . 
The Assembly also tore up its own constitutional right to 
amend the Constitution by deciding that any amendments will 
now have to be adopted by means of a referendum . General 
Suharto launched this idea several years ago, presenting it as a 
way of making sure that no attempts to alter the Constitution or 
undermine the Pan ca Sil a could ever succeed. 
The decisions, adopted by acclamation , had already been 
drafted and finalised by the MPR Working Committee weeks 
before the MPR session opened . In their eleven-day session, the 
MPR members had little more to do than ratify these decisions 
- "follow the script" , as the Far Eastern Economic Review put it 
(17th February, 1983)-and make speeches explaining why they 
agreed. 
As one Jakarta newspaper , quoted but not named by the 
FEER, put it: 
This obviously is the advantage of Panca Sila democracy in which 
controversial and complicated subjects can be discussed and settled 
beforehand (through committee work) . Therefore it is not necessary 
any more to hold fierce and sensational debates during the actual 
session as in the case of parliamentary democracy in the West. 
Finally , for the record , it is worth recording that in his 
opening speech, General Suharto told the Assembly that "under 
Panca Sila democracy, there is no such thing as an opposition". 
(Perhaps foreign commentators who still persist in referring to 
the PPP and the PDI as "opposition parties" will now stop doing 
so.) Suharto also announced that 1,800,000 government 
employees and 150,000 members of the Armed Forces have been 
through "P4" Panca Sita indoctrination courses , as a result of 
which, he declared , "there are enough signs to show that the 
Panca Sila is more deeply rooted than ever before". (Tempo, 5th 
March , 1983) 
GLOSSARY 
DPR The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Repre-
sentative Council) is Indonesia's lower chamber. 364 
members are chosen through so-called general elections ; 
the remaining 96 are appointed Armed Forces 'repre-
sentatives'. Golkar occupies nearly 70 per cent of the 
'elected ' seats. 
MPR The Maje/is Pemusyawaratan Rakyat (People 's 
Consultative Assembly) is Indonesia's upper chamber, 
composed of the 460 members of the DPR plus 460 
members appointed by the Executive. 83 per cent of MPR 
members are members of the Army-backed Golkar, re-
presentatives of the Armed Forces or are presidential/ 
Executive appointees . The MPR meets every five years to 
elect the President and Vice-President and adopt decisions 
on the broad lines of state policy. 
PPP The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development 
Unity P_arty) is the enforced fusion of Islamic parties, 
created m 1973. 
PD/ The Partai Demokratis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Democratic Party) is the enforced fusion of the non-
Islamic parties (nationalist and Christian), also created in 
1973. 
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Muslim 'subversion' trial opens just before MPR begins 
With less than a month to go before the 
1983 session of the MPR (upper chamber) 
was scheduled to begin , the trial opened in 
Jakarta of Adah Djaelani, a Muslim who is 
being charged under the Anti-Subversion 
Law with plotting to revive the Darul Islam 
movement and to subvert the 'Panca Sila 
state ' . 
Political observers in Jakarta see the 
timing of this trial as having been 
deliberately planned to issue warnings 
about the threat of Muslim subversion in 
the run-up to the MPR .session, "to justify 
the security precautions taken by the 
government" and "to discredit the 
Muslims" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
24th February 1983). The Review recalls 
that last year, just two days before the 1982 
general election campaign began, another 
Muslim, Imran bin Muhammed Zein, was 
sentenced to death on charges connected 
with the hijack affair. (See also T APOL 
Bulletin, No 52, July 1982) 
Darul Islam Aims Abandoned Long Ago, 
Says Defendant 
In his indictment, the prosecution claimed 
that not long after the defendant and 
others surrendered and accepted an 
amnesty, they started plotting again and 
organised underground movements in 
Continued from page I 
been undertaken. 
West. Central and East Java, in Aceh , 
Central and South Sumatra, and in 
Sulawesi . Djaelani strongly denies this . He 
acknowledges that he was a commander in 
the Dami Islam army which fought a 
protracted guerrilla war in West Java and 
elsewhere in Indonesia, aimed at the 
establishment of an Islamic state . The 
movement was led by S. M. Kartosuwiryo . 
Following the movement's defeat in 1962, 
some 30,000 followers. according to Tempo 
(19th February 1983) surrendered , were 
granted amnesties and rehabilitated into 
society . The defendant insists that no plans 
have been made to revive the movement . 
Djaelani told the court that he and 
others had indeed set up DI congregations 
solely for the purpose of preaching and 
religious education; they had no 
pretensions of opposing the Panca Sila or 
trying to overthrow the state. On the basis 
of his evidence, one of the defence lawyers 
reminded the court that a person "cannot 
be punished because of his aspirations". 
A large number of people have been 
arrested over the last couple of years in 
connection with this alleged plot. 
According to the Review , they include 
officials employed by the MPR and DPR 
secretariats, personnel from universities 
and high schools, a member of the previous 
Parliament, and other government 
officials. Tempo reports that no less than 
190 people are in detention in connection 
with this case . Eight are due to be tried 
shortly in Jakarta, and one is currently on 
trial in Surabaya. 
Chief Prosecution Witness Works for Army 
The chief prosecution witness, Ateng 
Djaelani , who provided the court with 
most of the assertions on the basis of which 
the defendant is being charged, was 
formerly a close associate of the 
defendant's in the Darul Islam, and 
surrendered together with him in 1962 . For 
many years however, he has been on the 
payroll of the West Java (Siliwangi) 
Divisional Command. 
According to the FEER, this latest anti-
subvcrsion trial has been greeted with 
more than the usual cynicism in Jakarta . 
One Jakarta newspaper, it writes, is 
concerned that the country's serious social 
and economic problems are not being 
addressed, and adds editorially : 
Those arc some of the thoughts that should 
now be keeping knowledgeable nationals 
busy for the right answer . not the Pancasila 
blah-blah or some delayed trials of defunct 
closet skeletons . 
Sources: FEER, 24th February, and Tempo 
19th February , 1983 
4. Following the presidential rejection, the LBH urged the 
President to reverse this decision, and condemned the use of the 
death sentence as a violation of human rights. In particular, 
LBH lawyers reject the use of the death sentence in political 
cases. (Tempo, 20th February, 1982) 
This suggests that interrogations are still going on in connection 
with Timzar Zubil's case . On what basis, then, has it been 
decided to proceed "definitely" with his execution? 
Political Motives Surrounding Muslim Trials 
A number of trials agaist Muslim dissidents in the last 18 months 
have clearly been timed to coincide with political events such as 
the 1982 general elections and the March 1983 session of 
Indonesia's upper chamber (MPR). At the MPR session, the 
Muslim party (PPP) was forced to support a Decree stipulating 
that all parties and organisations must abandon their own creeds 
and accept the Panca Sila as the sole ideology . The trials are seen 
as a deliberate effort by the government to intimidate Muslims 
and create the impression that Indonesia faces the threat of 
disruption from people who oppose the Panca Sila for reasons of 
their Islamic beliefs . 
5. The Merdeka news item referred to above reports Mr. Hasan 
Kartomihardjo as saying: 
. . . Timzar· Zubil's execution will definitely take place . At the 
moment some witnesses are still being interrogated and Timzar 
himself is being summoned too before the execution is to take place. 
.c 
' ~ " ! N -He . . . be . . . biar awet pak . . . ! & " Hey. . . hope it keeps you going. . . !" E 
(MPR member drinks herbal medicine) ~ 
In this connection , it is noteworthy that the rejection of 
commutation for Zubil was made public in February 1982, 
shortly before the 1982 general election campaign was due to 
begin , and that the report of his imminent execution appeared 
just two weeks before the MPR session opened on 1st March, 
1983. 
Protests and Calls for a Stay of Execution should be sent to : 
I. President Suharto, Office of the President, Jalan Veteran 
17, JAKARTA, Indonesia 
2. Commander of KOPKAMTIB, Clo 
Department of Defense and Security, Jalan Merdeka Barat 13, 
JAKARTA, Indonesia 
3. Lt. Gen. Ali Said S.H., Department of Justice, Jalan Hayam 
Wuruk 7, JAKARTA, Indonesia. 
Please send copies to T APOL 
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Teachers must spy on pupils 
Teachers in secondary schools in East Java have been instructed 
by the regional office of education to compile secret dossiers on 
their pupils. They are required to complete questionnaires for 
each child in their class , answering questions about the political 
activities of their parents and the child's own "subversive 
activities, political practices , criminal record and involvement in 
fights" . 
One local East Java Assembly member said that this would 
draw teachers into the work of the security apparatus . Another 
person who chairs the East Java association of private schools 
said that it seemed to be being implied that if a school-child's 
parent opposed the government , the child would automatically 
be a dissident as well. 
One parent commented that such dossiers could affect the 
chances of employment after the pupil left school, recalling that 
graduates from universities in Bandung are prevented from 
getting jobs in the civil service if they were active in the student 
movement while at university . 
An official at the education department claimed that the 
purpose of the questionnaire is to enable teachers to know the 
family background of their pupils. "Without such knowledge," 
he said, "there is little chance of education being successful·" 
Some teachers have shown extreme reluctance to complete 
the questionnaires. "Children in their teens are not involved in 
the political activities of their parents. They (the authorities) are 
turning us into intelligence agents," said one. 
Indeed , comments Tempo (26th February, 1983) which has 
reported this scandal : 
The teachers are required to carry out these investigations secretly, to 
scrape around for information from various sources so as to discover 
the background of the parents . Pupils and their parents can be asked 
for information for the questionnaires, provided they are not aware 
of the reason why such information is being sought. 
Police supervision of schools 
The police chief in one section of Jakarta is meanwhile drawing 
up a plan to require local police officers to "give guidance" to 
schoolchildren in their vicinity. The plan will require police 
officers to attend roll-calls as inspectors, as a way of bringing 
them into direct communication with the pupils as well as with 
the teachers. The four police officers at the district police-station 
will be required to visit regularly between them all the 200 
secondary schools in their district for this purpose . (Merdeka, 
19th November 1982) 
Army intimidates peasants 
Villagers from five villages in South Lampung, Sumatra have 
complained bitterly about military intervention to prevent them 
from cultivating land that has been illegally taken over by a state-
owned plantation. The land, more than 676 hectares in all, was 
seized by the plantation eleven years ago and used for the 
production of cloves and other cash crops. The villagers who 
own the land succeeded eventually in obtaining a document in 
October 1980 from the Governor of Lampung instructing the 
plan~tion to return the land to its rightful owners. The order has 
however been ignored, and villagers' attempts to cultivate their 
own crops have met with resistance from the company. 
In November 1982, two local military commanders 
intervened in the dispute on the side of the company. The 
villagers from two of the villages were summoned to attend a 
meeting which was described .as being an occasion for them to 
present their complaints to the local administrative authorities. 
When they turned up for the meeting, they found themselves 
confronted by the two Army officers who warned them not to 
proceed with their planting of crops. 
One villager describes how he was threatened .. and 
intimidated by the commander of the Sidomulyo ~1htary 
district; he was, he said, subjected to interrogation with v10lence 
and beaten for insisting on his right to toil the land. . . 
In an effort to obtain protection against this m1htary 
intervention, the villagers have appealed to the Minister of 
Defence , the Minister of the Interior , and other government 
authorities in Jakarta . They are deeply resentful that they have 
been prevented from enjoying the proceeds of their own land for 
eleven years. 
Source: Merdeka, 26th November 1982 
Subversion charge for 
distributing "state secrets" 
A former journalist of the banned Muslim daily, Abadi is on trial 
for subversion in Jakarta for obtaining and distributing 
government documents said to be "state secrets". One of the 
documents was a report by the Department of Defence and 
Security relating to plans for the 1982 general elections. The 
other, from the same Departmnt, was entitled "Guidance for 
Social Communications with the Muslim Community". 
The man on trial is Hasan Suraatmadja who was first arrested 
in 1978, together with Abadi's former editor, Soemarso 
Soemarsono, also accused of distributing "secret documents" . 
(Soemarso was detained for several years, then released because 
of ill-health; he died shortly afterwards.) On that occasion, 
Hasan was tried on similar charges and sentenced to two years 
and four months imprisonment. A year after his release in 1980, 
having served the full term of his sentence, he was re-arrested on 
new charges and has now been brought to trial for a second time. 
According to evidence presented in court, the documents in 
question had been delivered to a small printing works to be 
bound , without any indication that they were "state secrets". 
The prosecution argued that the documents were "secret" 
because they were only intended to be read by a limited number 
of officials. Hasan is being charged on the basis of a Law on 
Archives which defines all government documents, even those 
received from private , non-government concerns, as being for 
internal circulation only and therefore "state secrets". For good 
measure however, the defendant has in addition been charged 
with subversion. His defence lawyer strongly protested against 
the subversion charge. He also entered a number of demurrers 
against legal aspects of the trial , all of which were rejected by the 
court . 
Hasan was also formerly a branch secretary of the Muslim 
youth organisation , Gerakan Permuda Islam. 
Source: Tempo, 5th February 1983 
Anti-subversion trial in Aceh 
A man identified in press reports only as AJ bin H is on trial in 
Lhokseumawe district court for his involvement in the Aceh 
liberation struggle . He is said to have joined up with the move-
ment called the "GPLHT' in the official terminology (box , P .8) 
in 11970. He became territorial deputy-commander of Pase region 
in North Aceh, and was arrested in October 1980. 
The charges against him are that. both as an individual and 
together with others, he "corrupted the state ideology of Panca 
Sita and damaged the unity of the state, undermining its 
security ... He is also accused of "causing splits and disorders, dis-
turbances and anxieties in society on a wide scale within the 
territory of the motherland ." 
Source: Berita Buana, 5th Februrary, 1983. 
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East Timor 
New information confirms that 
resistance and opposition 
continue despite repression 
East Timorese refugees reaching Lisbon around the turn of the year have provided new information about conditions in East Timar which 
conflict sharply with Indonesian claims that "security" has now been established and hardly any resistance remains. Their evidence, together 
with information contained in articles that have appeared recently in the Indonesian press, shows that resistance is still widespread. 
Articles from two Indonesian publications, Tempo and Sinar Harapan. have become available, written following a trip to East Timor in · 
January of over two dozen senior journalists and editors from all the major Jakarta publications. We quote extensively from the Tempo 
article and comment on the Sinar Harapan articles. . 
Information from refugee sources 
Below are summaries of refugees ' testimony published in Timor 
Newsletter (January 1983). They spoke in all cases anonymously, 
for the obvious reasons . 
Witness 1 reached Lisbon in late 1982 after spending several 
months in Jakarta arranging his papers . He explained that he left 
Timor "for fear of his life and (because of) the absence of the 
rule of law" . He did a " tour" of key Indonesian prisons after 
surrendering to the Army in 1978. He was first held in a 
detention centre in Baucau together with about a thousand 
prisoners, and was severely beaten under interrogation . All 
prisoners were forced daily to '"jump on the spot a hundred times 
although many were in poor condition and some were old 
people". He was falsely accused of being a Fretilin supporter (in 
fact, he had previously been imprisoned by the Fretilin). Like 
others accused of Fretilin sympathies in Baucau prison, he was 
given electric shock treatment and had burns all over his body. 
Torture in Baucau, he said, was directed by a Major Genap of 
the Army intelligence . 
Later he was transferred to Comarca Prison in Dili which was 
extremely overcrowded, with no proper sanitary facilities and a 
high incidence of tuberculosis. Things may have improved since 
the International Red Cross gained access to East Timor in 1979 
but he is certain prisoners there are still suffering great 
hardships, and some have been there for very long terms . He 
met Timorese there in 1979 who had been there since 1975 and 
has every reason to believe some of these were still there in 1982. 
Aside from fear, he mentioned travel restrictions and the 
prohibition on the use of Portuguese and Tetum as reasons for 
wanting to leave his homeland . 
While in Jakarta before leaving for Lisbon, he heard that 
Fretilin attacked the outskirts of Dili in November or December 
1982. 
Witness 2 receives regular, uncensored letters from East Tim or . 
The following are quotations from these letters: 
The Front continues to launch attacks on the Javanese . always at the 
same time and hour in various parts of Timar ... The Javanese (use) 
the hansip1 to fight against their brothers ... Thus. Timorese kill 
Timorese and the Islamic Javanese stand and laugh making money, 
robbing and destroying ... (Leifer dated 12 October 1982) 
The country has been closed to all corners of the world so that we 
have heard nothing of what is being said about Timor. What is certain 
is that since August. the Front has been considerably active and is 
winning more territory . although it is very limited by the lack of 
outside assistance. (Letter dated 22 No1•emher 1982) 
Witness 3 received a letter in December with the following: 
Speaking of Tacc Tolo and Arcia Branca . these are sites where the 
Indonesians arc accustomed to liquidate and martyrise Timorese. At 
these two places. thousands of Timorcsc were massacred and the 
blood of innocents is still being spilt there . 
(Note: Tace Tolo is a lagoon on the road from Dili to Viqueque. 
Arcia Branca is the former tourist beach on the outskirts of Dili.) 
Witness 4 arrived in Lisbon direct from Dili in January. She s'aid 
Mgr Martinho da Costa Lopez. Apostolic Administrator of Dili, 
recently denounced , in a sermon she heard herself, the burning 
alive of a man by Indonesian troops in Zumalai last September. 
She said that in November (when the UN was discussing the East 
Timor resolution) a rumour swept Dili that the Portuguese 
would return. Fighting around Dili broke out in November and 
was continuing when she left ; the curfew had been re-
introduced . Armoured cars were patrolling the streets at night 
and in December, ships disembarked along the coast in Baucau . 
Living costs in Dili are high because of the price of rice. 
Unemployed Timorese were experiencing hardship because they 
could not afford to buy rice. 
Witness 5 arrived in Lisbon in February 1983 after spending a 
month in Jakarta . He left Dili, he said, because of "the climate 
of fear and insecurity" . He was beaten up by Indonesian soldiers 
last year. He also feared a new famine in 2 or 3 years and said the 
rice harvest was not enough to feed the population . 
A situation of open warfare has returned, he said, though in 
some parts things had normalised . In the areas where he 
travelled, towards and across the border into West Timor , things 
were quiet, but he was quite emphatic that "things are really 
hot" in places like Same and Ainaro in the south-central region 
and especially in the eastern sector - Lospales, Ossu, Matebian 
and Yiqueque. He had been told of an attack on an Indonesian 
convoy of about thirty soldiers in Same by a group of youngsters, 
aged around twelve, who were fighting with the resistance. He 
too, like Witness 4, gave testimony about the arrival of "red-
beret" (RPKAD) 1 troops in late 1982. A large naval vessel, 
number 971, arrived in Dili harbour. Three landing-craft ferried 
red-beret commandos ashore; about two hundred disembarked 
in Dili, others disembarked at Baucau , Lospales and Viqueque. 
They frequent the Sporting Club, talking occasionally to 
Timorese which is how people know they were sent to put down 
1. This regiment is now known as Kopassandha. 
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resistance in the east.The witness did not think they were 
relieving other troops because troops from Jakarta do a ten-
month tour of duty. and it was not yet time to replace them . 
Recently , Indonesians were using more and more Timorese 
conscripts - hansip - to "Timorise" the war. 
According to the witness, it was unusual for troops to come 
through Dili ; due to the secrecy concealing the war, they 
normally travel direct to Baucau, the centre of military 
operations. The fact that the troops came through Dili this time, 
some of them staying there, may be due to reported restlessness 
in the capital around the time of the UN debate last November. 
The Hawke government 
and East Timor 
Speculation is rife about the change that can be expected in 
Australian policy on East Timar, following the ' election of a 
Labour .government under Bob Hawke in Australia. The Dutch 
journalist, Wio Joustra (Volkskrant, 8th March, 1983), writing 
from Canberra, believes that "Australia's relations with 
Indonesia will undoubtedly undergo a cooling-off. By contrast 
with the conservatives, the Labour Party refuses to accept 
Indonesia's annexation of East Timar." 
The Far Eastern Economic Review (17th March 1983) reports 
that Indonesia fears that "implementation of the Labour 
platform, and a possible reversal of the Australian position on 
Eas~ Timar at the UN could further influence the vote of small 
Pacific nations" . (This is an indirect reference to the efforts by 
~he Australi~n diplomats at last year's General Assembly to 
mfluence votmg by Pacific countries by threatening withdrawal 
of economic aid .) 
The FEER reported that on his first day in office, the new 
Prime Minister indicated that relations with Indonesia would be 
an important priority. He said: 
I have no doubt we will be able to re-establish between a Labour 
g~vernment and _Indonesia effective relations as is appropriate for 
this country and its near and very populous neighbour. 
The Review speculates that if the new government were to 
manage to modify party policy on East Timar for a time, it would 
come under strong pressure from the active East Timar lobby 
withjn the Labour Party . 
Labour's East Timor Policy 
For the record, the resolution on foreign affairs adopted in 
19~2 by the Australian Labour Party includes the following 
pomts: 
recognition of the inalienable right of the East Timorese to 
self-determination and independence, and rejection of the 
Australian government's recognition of the Indonesian 
annexation; 
opposition to all defence aid to Indonesia until there is a 
complete withdrawal of Indonesian occupation troops from 
East Timar; 
aid to East Timar should benefit the Timorese people, and 
not support Indonesian government integration processes or 
military strategy; 
support for the free migration of Timorese; 
opposi~ion to t~e operations of Australian companies in 
East Timar until self-determination has been achieved · 
support for UN resolutions which promote the rights of the 
people of East Timar. 
Another issue is the fate of the Australian Senate inquiry on 
East Timor last year, before which a great deal of evidence 
including a written and oral submission from TAPOL, wa~ 
presented. Following the elections, the chairmanship of the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee will be held by the new 
governing party. It is not yet clear whether the Committee will 
produce its findings on the basis of evidence already submitted 
or will wish to hold further investigations before publishing a 
report. 
The Indonesian JJ 
Tempo on the resistance: 
Translated extract 
Learning from the experiences in lrian Jaya , the central 
government is trying to handle East Timar with greater caution . 
Possibly to avoid the charge of "domination by newcomers", 
almost all top functions are held by people from the region . Yet 
nevertheless, there still are criticisms of the attitudes of these 
newcomers. Mario Carrascalao, the Governor of East Timar,. 
acknowledges this . 
There are reports of newcomers taking advantage of the 
abnormal situation for personal gain .. .. they occupied homes 
and land abandoned by their owners during the civil war, then 
refused to pay for them or quit when the owners return and ask 
for their property back. These psychological gaps and 
obstructions worsen because of communication problems. The 
majority of East Timorese don't understand Indonesian which is 
still being actively pushed. This needs plenty of time and 
guidance, and good will on both sides. 
As a result, there is the impression that physical development 
is moving faster than human development. Human development 
indeed seems to be the major problem in East Timar. 
Integration is young in years, yet many 'imported' social 
problems have already appeared. Government officials are 
beginning to ask for 'fag-money' for their services. Many reports 
are not being sent on to superiors. Illegal levies are becoming 
widespread, particularly outside the towns, at the posts set up to 
examine travel passes which are still required in East Timar. 
There are rumours of corruption and leakage of funds . 
On top of this, there is an even greater problem: for the six 
years of integration, East Timar has lived almost entirely on 
subsidies from the central government. Far too many facilities 
are obtained with great ease; for instance, the distribution of 
food, medicines and the construction of houses. 
From the security point of view, the provision of these 
facilities is understandable because one of the tactics used by the 
Armed Forces has been to "seize sympathy" away from the GPK 
( Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan, or Gangs of Security-
Disruptors ). According to Colonel Purwanto, Commander of 
Korem (Military Command) 164/Wira Dharma, there are still 
two or three hundred Fretilin remnants with a hundred weapons, 
plus a number of people who are being forced to go along with 
them. "Their movement is no longer significant. The operations 
to crush them have entered the final phase," said Purwanto. 
"The GPK exists in a few districts classified as 'first-Class 
Troublespots', where they carry out terror and robberies." 
Th~y are apparently difficult to stamp out because they are at 
one with. the people. A characteristic of East Timar society is 
that family . bonds are very strong: helping the family, even if 
~hey GPK, 1s seen as the top priority. They hide in the forest and 
m the mountains. "It's not possible to carry out an operation like 
LINGUISTIC ACROBATICS 
To guide readers through the confusion of terms coined by 
the Indonesian authorities to refer to the various liberation 
movements with which they have to contend we provide 
the following glossary: ' 
GP K or Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan, meaning 
"security-disruptors gangs" is used for the liberation 
movement in East Timar led by Fretilin. 
GP L or Gerombolan Pengacau Liar, meaning "wild-
disruptors ga~gs" ~s used for Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka, the hberat10n movement in West Papua. 
GPLHT or Gerombolan Pengacau Liar Hasan Tiro 
meaning "Hasan Tiro's wild-disruptors' gangs" is used 
for the Aceh National Liberation Front. 
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Operasi Ganesha, rounding them all up. then screening them:·· 
said Purwanto. 
This is why the approach being used is that of development. 
Every time the GPK burns down people's homes, better ones are 
built. "The more they wage terror, the more unpopular they 
become ," said Purwanto. "We have to deal with them patiently" 
he added. Those who "come to their senses" and come down 
from the mountains will be placed in settlement projects and 
given food aid." 
'Tm carrying out a kind of fortress-system, the tactic used at 
the time of the Diponegoro War 1, building settlements to press 
back the GPK" , said Purwanto, 42 years old, a 1961 graduate of 
the Armed Forces Academy. 
One other consequertce of the efforts to stamp out the GPK is 
the "Atauro case" which has shocked the international press. To 
cut GPK's ties with their families, some four thousand GPK 
family members have been placed on Atauro island since 1981. 
They get homes and food aid, including help from the 
International Red Cross . Some foreign newspapers reported that 
these thousands of people have been imprisoned in Atauro. 
"That isn't true. Atauro isn't a concentration camp," said 
Purwanto. A churchman confirmed that. "Their conditions are 
indeed good. They get enough food and other needs. A pastor 
visits them regularly, " he said. 
The local government and the Armed Forces leaders plan to 
resolve the Atauro problem speedily. Most of these 'displaced 
persons' refuse to work and are happier depending on aid. There 
is a plan to move them to resettlement projects so that they can 
live on their own. Funding for this is a problem at the moment. 
Another result of the civil war and the security situation in 
East Timor is that there are about 10,000 civil guards (hansip). 
This means that one in 55 of the population are in hansip. They 
.,, ~o 
get Rp .10,000 a month (less than $15). There are also thousands 
of ratih (people's trainees) who only get some corn each time 
they go on duty . Demobilisation of the hansip without well-
thought-out preparations could result in frustration and social 
unrest. In addition, there are thousands of widows and orphans 
in need of special attention. 
These socially disturbing issues could become aggravated 
because there are apparently still circles in East Timor who do 
not totally agree with integration . Some even believe that the 
Fretilin leaders in the mountains are in fact good Catholics who 
only declared themselves communists "as a tactic to get support 
and help". 
(I) This system, used by the Dutch colonial army against the mass-
based Prince Diponegoro rebellion in Central Java in the late 
1820s, is described by the Australian historian Ricklefs as a system 
" by which small mobile columns operated independently , from an 
ever-growing network of strategic fortified posts and permanently 
policed the population". (M. Ricklefs, A History of Modern 
Indonesia , 198 l, page 112) Purwanto's reference to Dutch colonial 
military strategy as his own model is an interesting pointer to the 
type of war the Indonesian Armed Forces are now waging in East 
Timor. (This footnote is from TAPOL.) 
UN Human Rights Commission supports self-determination 
On 16th February, the UN Commission on Human Rights 
adopted the following sesolution with 16 votes in favour, 14 
against and ten abstentions. (Three delegations in the 43-nation 
Commission did not take part in the voting): 
The Commission on Human Rights 
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to 
self-determination and independence, in accordance with 
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); 
2. Declares that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely 
to determine their own future on the basis of the relevant 
General Assembly Resolutions and the relevant United 
Nations human rights instruments; 
3. Calls upon all interested parties, namely Portugal, as the 
administering Power, and the representatives of the East 
Timorese people, as well as Indonesia, to co-operate fully 
with the United Nations with a view to guaranteeing the free 
and full exercise of the right to self-determination by the 
people of East Timor; 
4. Expresses its deepest concern at the suffering of the people of 
East Timor now prevailing in the Territory; 
S. Calls upon all parties concerned to facilitate the entry into the 
Territory of international aid to alleviate the suffering of the 
people of East Timor. 
Voting in favour were: Brazil, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Ghana, 
Ireland, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United 
Republic of Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. 
Voting against were: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, 
Canada, Colombia, Fiji, Gambia, India, Japan, Jordan, 
Pakistan, Philippines, United States, and Uruguay. 
Abstaining were: Finland, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, 
United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. 
Indonesian lobbying efforts defeated 
Although th resolution was passed by such a narrow majority, it 
is a significant victory because, as the International Herald 
Tribune pointed out (15th February 1983), Indonesia was 
"lobbying furiously" to defeat it. Its delegation issued a 
statement a week before the vote in Geneva, referring to visits to 
East Timor by the International Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees as proof there was no famine 
or human rights violations there. But the.statement, says IHT, 
embarrassed the two agencies. A spokesman for the UN office said 
Friday that, though the agency operated a small repatriation program 
from East Timor to Australia, it had never mounted an investigation 
mission. 
A Red Cross spokesman said Friday that the food situation had 
clearly improved but he warned that the 1982 rice crop had fallen far 
short of needs and that food aid would still be needed. 
The report also pointed out that ICRC delegates had visited 
3,737 "displaced persons" on Atauro island and 93 prisoners in 
Dili, of whom "13 were detained in connection with guerrilla 
activity". Ten months later, delegates made follow-up visit to 
3.794 "displaced persons" and 128 prisoners in Dili and another 
prison. (In other words, even in terms of the restricted number 
of political prisoners to whom the ICRC has been given access, 
the numbers involved had increased in the past year.) 
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Sinar Harapan misinforms 
on East Timor: A comment 
The Sinar Harapan journalist, Kustigar Nadeak, produced two 
articles (SH, 25th and 26th January) following his visit to East 
Timor. Whilst providing on the one hand a confusing account of 
the present state of resistance, the art ides unquestioningly 
reproduce information , much of it clearly inaccurate, from the 
military commander and the Indonesian-appointed Timorese 
governor , without making any attempt at verification. 
Regarding the resistance , he reports the military commander 
as saying that 
only five hundred people remain. spread throughout various districts 
and subdistricts . Just imagine: there are thirteen districts in East 
Timor which means 37 terrorists (geromho/1111) on average to each 
district. They disappear into the bush and the forests . and in 
particular they are sheltered by their families . In such conditions. it is 
difficult to distinguish between who are terrorists. and who are not. 
Elsewhere, the writer has the following to say: 
Why has it taken so long to crush the rebel remnants? This was the 
question journalists asked Colonel Purwanto . Indeed, it is difficult 
(was the reply) . It is extremely risk y if a village of about 300 people is 
guarded by only two soldiers. In particular , if the gangs link up with 
members of their families . it is very difficult to identify them . It is 
impossible to know whom one should be chasing . .. For this reason ... 
said Purwanto . "it isn't possible to crush them in the way the PLO 
was defeated in Lebanon ... 
If it is so difficult to identify resistance fighters in villages under 
military guard, how can the writer accept Purwanto's estimate of 
the overall size of the resistance? 
Nadeak 's articles are also full of distortions of East Timor's 
history, all based on the version of events given by the 
commander . For example, he writes that the coup in Dili on I Ith 
August 1975 was launched by Fretilin ; UDT counter-attacked , 
took control of government buildings, after which "Fretilin 
troops descended from the surrounding hills, entered Dili and 
kicked UDT out". (It is perfectly well established that the coup 
was launched by the UDT.) Then, we are told, two days after 
Fretilin declared independence on 28th November 1975, a 
coalition of four pro-Indonesian parties - Apodeti, Kota, 
Tr.abalhista and UDT - proclaimed independence and at the 
same time proclaimed East Timor·s integration into Indonesia. 
"Then, the civil war continued until troops of these four parties 
succeeded in seizing Dili on 7th December , 1975 ." (The fact is, 
of course , that Dili was invaded by Indonesian troops on that 
day.) 
"Do They Know How Backward They Are? 
Another feature of the articles is the contempt shown for the 
East Timor people . They are described as people ··who used to 
live wild in the mountains" until the Indonesians came along, 
brought them down to the plains and built settlements for them. 
They are described as people who know nothing about how to 
cultivate the land. They are "sunk in alcoholism: they don ' t care 
if they don ' t eat so long as they can get liquor. This is the worst 
feature of East Timorese people ." Or. take this: 
Yet they understand that they are still very backwar_d . In a charming 
little church that was recently built for them m the v1llage . they often 
pray to God asking him to give them a decent life. . 
" Do they know how backward they are?" one iournahst asked an 
elementary school teacher who went to East Timor four years ago. 
Yes . the y do . because if someone comes along wearing better clothes 
than them. they want to copy them. 
The writer attempts to contradict foreign journalists who have 
written alarming reports about conditions in East Timor, by 
claiming that "these foreign journalists compare housing in East 
Timor with housing in New York or Australia . .. If they were 
genuinely concerned they would make their comparisons with 
the 450 years of Portuguese rule when mosquitoes multiplied so 
fast that there was a 50 per cent (sic) death rate ." 
The Sinar Harapan articles are an example of the mis-
information spread in Indonesia about conditions in East Timor. 
This daily is a non-government, Christian paper and might have 
been expected to distance itself at least a little from official 
propaganda supplied to Indonesian journalists on a well-
publicised trip openly designed to counter the many critical 
reports that have been published about East Times in the world 
press. 
SIX MOLUCCANS 
ACQUITTED ON APPEAL 
The six Moluccans who were sentenced in Assen, Holland 
to three years' imprisonment for allegedly firing on a 
police van with intent to kill (see TAPOL Bulletin, No . 54, 
November 1982) were all acquitted on appeal in February . 
The acquittals were based on the unconvincing nature of 
the evidence presented by the prosecution. During the 
appeal proceedings , the prosecution had made a demand 
for the sentence to be increased to five years. 
AN ACT OF GENOCIDE: 
INDONESIA'S INVASION 
OF EAST TIMOR 
by Arnold Kohen and John Taylor Foreword by Noaril Oiomslcy 
Published by TAPOL 
Copies still available. Price £1.75 
plus 40 pence postage (UK/worldwide surface) 
or £2 .00 (airmail) . 
More West Papuans flee across border to PNG 
More than a thousand Papuans have fled across the border into 
Papua New Guinea in the past month, reported a Dutch 
journalist in the Volkskrant on 17th February last. "Most of 
them are mal-nourished and urgently in need of medical 
treatment," he added. The PNG government has appealed to the 
UN High Commission of Refugees for financial and medical 
assistance to help cope with the problem. 
For the time being, the refugees have been given shelter by 
villagers in settlements in the border region but the government 
in Port Moresby intends to return them soon to Indonesia. Tht 
PNG authorities are reportd to be very concerned about the high 
influx of refugees in the last few weeks and believe that there are 
two reasons, according to Volkskrant: first of all , the renewed 
Indonesian offensive against the OPM (Free Papua Movement) 
and second, a significant escalation in the transmigration 
programme along the border between the Indonesian province 
of Irian Jaya and PNG. This programme involves the settlement 
of many thousands of Javanese in regions where the military are 
trying to contain the OPM. 
Jakarta's tactic is to create a kind of buffer zone of Javanese estates 
between the West Irianese and the border . A beginning has already 
been made in constructing the necessary infrastructure in uninhabited 
regions and at the same time work has begun on the border road 
stretching from Jayapura in the north to Merauke in the south . 
Palmoil and rubber are to be the main products of these estates which 
the Indonesians are referring to as "nucleus estates" . The fact that 
this ambitious programme goes hand in hand with the expropriation 
of traditional lands and the disruption of West Irianese communities 
living in the region hardly troubles Jakarta at all. 
Volkskrant also reports that the official Indonesian explanation 
for the very large number of refugees is the prolonged drought. 
As readers of TAPOL Bulletin (No. 55) will recall, an 
extremely severe famine has hit parts of the Baliem Valley in the 
past nine months . In the absence of more detailed information 
about the composition of these new refugees, it is not possible to 
speculate on whether indeed this famine and the Indonesian 
neglect to bring relief and help to the victims is a factor driving 
Papuans across the border in search of succour. 
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Indonesian students in Europe could lose passports 
Several Indonesian students in West Europe are in danger of 
losing their passports and could be forced either to return home 
or seek political asylum abroad . The action is seen as an attempt 
to intimidate Indonesian students abroad and to put an end to 
independent political activity that has developed in some 
European cities during the past few years. 
Two of the students who could lose their passports are Pipit 
Rochiyat and Zainal Fatichin in West Berlin, activists in the 
West Berlin branch of Perhimpunan Indonesia, (PI) the 
association of Indonesian students abroad. The third is 
Aboepriyadi Santoso, a student in Holland who has also been 
involved in launching a study group called Yayasan Dialog 
Nusantara. 
Political Victimisation 
All three were recently given passport renewals of only six 
months instead of the two-year renewal normally granted . Pipit 
Rochiyat has received a letter dated 7th March 1983 from the 
Indonesian Consul in West Berlin which makes it clear that this 
short-term passport renewal is an act of political victimisation . 
The substance of the letter reads as follows: 
I) . .. 
2) In addition to administering to the needs of Indonesian citizens 
abroad, the function of Indonesian Representation Offices abroad. 
including the Office in West Berlin, is to exercise supervision over 
and make evaluations of these citizens. 
3) In this connection, the Indonesian Representation Office in West 
Berlin evaluates your activities up to now as being extremely harmful 
to Indonesia's national interests. 
4) I therefore draw your attention to the renewal of your passport for 
a period of six months, in the hope that this may be a warning to you 
in your future activities . (signed) Purnomo Joedokoesoemo. 
Pipit Rochiyat, who makes it quite clear that he has always 
been quite open about his political activity, has provided 
information which sets out the background to this evaluation: 
- In January 1982, he walked out of the compulsory 
Indoctrination Course (P4) in Germany and refused to attend 
further sessions. (According to a Decision of the Indonesian 
upper chamber, MPR, in 1978, all Indonesian citizens are 
required to attend and "pass" a P4 course which propagates the 
state dogma of Panca Sila and inculcates rigid loyalty to the State 
Constitution.) 
- He has been held responsible for the display of a photo of the 
late President Sukarno at PI seminars held in Dusseldorf earlier 
this year. A letter from the Indonesian Ambassador in Bonn to 
the PI complained that displaying Sukarno's photo could "create 
a situation that is not helpful ~n establishing close ties within the 
Indonesian community in the German Federal Republic". The 
Ambassador said that in all such gatherings, only the photos of 
the President and the Vice-President may be displayed. 
- Pipit has been active in the European-based Movement for 
the Defence of Democracy and Basic Human Rights. This 
organisation publishes a bulletin called Berita Tanpa Sensor 
(Uncensored Reports). 
- Accusations have been made against the West Berlin PI 
branch in which he is active, claiming that it has 'fallen under 
PKI influence'. 
DAKIN Officer Now Consul in West Berlin 
There is strong reason to believe that this intensification of 
pressure on PI activists in Europe, particularly in West Berlin, is 
the work of the newly-appointed Consul in West Berlin, Colonel 
Purnomo Joedokoesoemo. According to reports from West 
Berlin, when talking to students there, he makes no secret of the 
fact that he is an officer of BA KIN, Indonesia's central 
intelligence agency. 
PI under close Embassy control 
The passport threats now being made against Pl activists 
highlights the•fact that Indonesian embassies keep a close watch 
on the activities of the PI and exert strong pressure on it to toe 
the government's line in all matters. Very few branches have 
been able to extricate themselves from this supervision and elect 
executives that properly represent the wishes and opinions of 
their members . One of the handful of branches to have done so 
is in West Berlin which is far mtlre outspoken about conditions in 
Indonesia . West Berlin activists were , for example, among a 
number of students who added their signatures last year to the 
strongly critical document known as the Petition-of-Fifty. 
The victimisation of PI activists is clearly aimed at 
intimidating Indonesian students abroad in the hope of forcing 
them to abandon any idea of taking an independent stance 
towards conditions in Indonesia . 
Pipit concludes his document summarising the acts of 
intimidation against him with the words: "All colleagues who 
love our country should continue their activities as usual; do not 
let your spirits flag" . 





Tengku Muhammed Usman 
Lampoh Awe, 45 years old, was 
arrested in October 1978 in 
Medan, North Sumatra and was 
tried in November 1980. He was 
tried with subversion for being 
the Minister of Finance in the 
government set up in Aceh by the 
National Liberation Front of 
Acheh Sumatra. During the trial, 
he refused to use Indonesian and 
demanded to be allowed to speak in the Acehnese language. 
Although the prosecution had demanded a sentence of three 
years, Usman Lampoh Awe was given a sentence of twenty 
years. The court made it quite clear, in passing its verdict, that 
he had been given such a heavy sentence because of his refusal to 
speak Indonesian. 
Tengku Lampoh Awe became politically active early in life. 
His father, a judge at the High Court in Pidie, was murdered by 
Indonesian troops during operations against an earlier Acehnese 
movement, in 1950. He himself, while still in his teens, was saved 
from death by his mother who protected him against Indonesian 
troops who had set fire to the family home. All the other men 
and boys in the house at the time were killed. He was appointed 
Minister of Finance by the NLFAS in December 1976. After his 
arrest, he was subjected to severe torture, but upheld his opinion 
that the NLF AS government was "the sole legal government in 
Aceh" and continued to maintain that the people must be 
allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. 
A report that appeared in the Indonesian press during the 
early hearings of his trial stated that two witnesses who testified 
at his trial, both of whom had held ministerial posts in the Free 
Acehnese government, persisted in calling him "honourable 
minister". "This is greatly to be regretted," wrote one newspaper 
at the time, "because both these men have been freed of all 
charges and they both surrendered to the military commander in 
response to the commander's and Governor's offer of amnesty." 
(Sinar Indonesia Barn, April 1980, date not given in the clipping) 
A request has been made to UNESCO to discuss the case of 
Tengku Lampoh Awe at its annual meeting in May this year 
because of the fact that his sentence is clearly based on an act of 
cultural victimisation . 
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"Indonesia has many friends in world marketplace" 
- World Bank president 
The World Bank President's ful some support for Indonesia's 
economic strategy of rapid economic growth was expressed in no 
uncertain terms during his visit to Indonesia in October last year. 
Stressing how "deeply impressed" he and his team were . A. W. 
Clausen said : 
Indonesia has not only built up a remarkable record of economic 
growth, but it has a government that has been realistic and willing to 
make tough economic policy deci sions. 
He said that unless the international economic situation got 
more severe than it is today. it was very natural for Indonesia to 
continue to finance this growth. As far as Indonesia's 
creditworthiness is concerned , he was very enthusiastic indeed: 
I should say that Indonesia . . deserves and is getting and will 
continue to receive. the highest credit rating in the international 
marketplace. Indonesia also has many friends in the international 
marketplace and also on a bilateral basis. (Indonesia Development 
News , November 1982) 
Import-Export Deficit of $6.6 billion in 1982 
According to figures published by Indonesia's central bank 
governor , Rachmat Saleh. Indonesia suffered a balance of trade 
deficit of nearly seven billion dollars in 1982 by comparison with 
a surplus the previous year. 
Exports: 
Imports: 
$19 .8 billion , 
$26.4 billion, 
down 15% on 1981 
up 9% on 1981 
Petroleum exports fell by 19% and non-petroleum exports fell _by 
10% . The only item to move positively was natural gas which 
rose by 4.3 % , to $2.4 billion . 
The prospects of further reductions in the price of petroleum 
are, says FEER, "very worrying" because 60% of government 
revenues come from taxes on oil companies and 70% of export 
earnings come from oil products. 
The Finance Ministry's projection of a balance of trade deficit 
of $6.2 billion for 1983 is likely to be seriously exceeded because 
of OPEC's failure to stabilise prices and the significant price 
drop that could well occur during the course of this year. (Far 
Eastern Economic Review , 3rd March , 1983) 
While the World Bank persists in encouraging Indonesia to 
maintain high growth rates and continue with its " tough 
economic decisions", Richard Cowper , BBC and Financial 
Times correspondent in Jakarta, speaking on BBC's The World 
Today programme (2nd March, 1983) predicted that Indonesia 
would need to turn to the International Monetary Fund for help 
to the tune of $500 million before the end of 1983, to help cope 
with fast-falling foreign exchange reserves. 
World Bank Loan Commitment to Indonesia by Sector, as of June 30, 1982 
Loan Commitment Number of Percentage of 
Sector (millions of dollars) Projects Total Commitment 
Agriculture, irrigation 
and transmigration 2,006.0 46 36.0 
Electricity and coal 
mining 1,525.0 14 27.0 
Industrial development 557.5 13 10.1 
Transportation 797.4 13 14.2 
Education 336.4 12 6.3 
Urban development and 
water supply 225.0 6 4.1 
Population and nutrition 85.7 4 1.5 
Technical assistance 25.0 6 0.4 
Tourism 16.0 1 0.2 
Telecommunications 12.8 1 0.2 
Total 5,586.9 116 100.0 
Source: World Bank 
A. W. Clausen in Indonesia, October 1982 
Trade union leader calls for wage cuts 
Agus Sudono, Chairman of Indonesia's only trade union 
federation, the FBSI, made a call last December for cuts in 
wages of the workforce in order to prevent company closures. 
This statement has led to protests from worker representatives . 
A group of workers from the Union of Public Workers 
(SBLP) in Jakarta, Bogar, Tangerang and Bekasi who visited 
the FBSl to demand the withdrawal of the statement , told 
Merdeka that the employers had used Sudono's statement to 
dismiss workers and force a cut in wages . They said that in 
negotiations their union was now engaged in with the 
management, the management side were throwing Sudono's 
statement at the worker representatives . 'The time has now 
come," said one worker representative, "for genuine efforts to 
be made to struggle for the basic human rights of workers . Up to 
now workers are just being utilised as tools of production by the 
employers." Sudono's statement had had the effect of destroying 
the struggle of workers who are still living below the poverty 
level. 
A similar protest against Sudono's statement was also made 
by the Jakarta committee of the Metal and Ceramic Workers 
Union (SBLK). It deplored the fact that Sudono's statement had 
been used by management to undermine the negotiating position 
of the SBLP. "The FBSI leadership knows very well," said the 
SBLK statement, "that 60% of Indonesian workers are living 
below the poverty line ." 
Dismissals Hit Many Workers 
Numerous reports of layoffs by companies are being reported in 
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the Indonesian press . Merdeka (24th November 1982) warned 
that· as many as 1112 million workers may be laid off in the textile 
industry which has been particularly severely hit by the world 
recession . An editorial comment by Merdeka however provides 
an interesting insight into the background to many of these 
layoffs and the way Sudono's much publicised declaration is 
bearing fruit : 
ils1 Q 
INDONESIAN WORKERS AND THEIR 'llt 
RIGHT TO ORGANISE 
Update No. 2 
The motives behind these layoffs should be thoroughly investigated. 
In cases where workers are dismissed by a company that remains in 
business, management tactics need to be examined. We believe that 
the basic motive is not that the company is bankrupt. It is. rather . a 
move by the company to cut their wage costs . The wages being 
earned by those in employment are considered to be too high even 
though they amount to no more than a few hundred rupiahs a day . In 
such a case , workers are dismissed and replaced by new workers at a 
lower wage level. (Merdeka. 3rd December 1982, editorial) 
Published by INDOC, this booklet will document the 
growing military intervention in labour relations , using 
throughout cases reported° in the Indonesian press. 
Issues covered include: 
- KOPKAMTIB's system of "early detection" of 
labour disputes ; 
- indications that the government is planning to 
ban all strikes and revise a number of relatively 
favourable labour laws; The paper also expressed the fear that layoffs were affecting in 
particular the Jabour-intensive industries, for instance the textile 
industry. If this is allowed to proceed unchecked, the paper said , 
the level of unemployment could rise dramatically . "It is difficult 
to contemplate the moral , social and economic effects on 
conditions in society," the paper said . 
- strikes and protests against mass dismissals and 
declining living standards; 
- the role of the labour union, FBSI, in 
undermining workers ' actions, banning a trade 
union journal , etc. 
Read side by side with the enthusiastic remarks of the 
president of the World Bank (see opposite page), one would 
hardly think they were talking about the same country. 
This Update has been produced in the hope of 
hastening efforts to bring the question of infringements 
of the right to organise (under ILO Convention No. 98) 
to the attention of the ILO at its session this year. 
******** 
Order copies from INDOC, Postbus 11250, 2301 EG 
Leiden , Netherlands. 
Readers' letters 
A reply to 
Jusfiq Hadjar 
Whilst welcoming Hadjar's challenge (see 
TAPOL Bulletin No.55 January 1983: 
Guest Column/19-20), I think a reply is in 
order to his clarion call since it sounds so 
sanctimonious that some T APOL readers 
might have a wrong impression about 
Indonesia's non-Muslim groups 
(particularly the Marxist one , with whom I 
identify myself). 
Glib rhetoric about "democracy" is all 
very well, faddishly speaking, but I for one 
need a great deal more substance to accept 
his claim that "democratic ideas are most 
likely to develop among Muslims". If it is 
"easier for Muslims to accept the need for 
democracy (sic) " simply, as he puts it, 
"because virtually the entire military 
power clique consists of Abangan" , I am 
hardly surprised that he (and the Muslims 
he represents) are still waiting for the 
response from any of the groups he 
mentions. 
What, and for whom, is this 
"democracy" Hadjar is talking about? And 
how does he propose to achieve such a 
"democracy"? If it is a "democracy" for the 
bourgeoisie, we can ape the West (as some 
of us are doubtless already trying to do) . If 
it is "democracy" for the client-capitalists 
and comprador-bureaucrats, this is 
precisely what we are having at present. If 
it is "democracy" for the majority of the 
people - comprising petty peddlars, stall-
holders, the majority of wage earners as 
well as small peasants (as opposed to big , 
mostly Muslim be it noted, landlords) -
then only the Marxists have a clear-cut 
programme on how to achieve this . 
Incidentally, it was primarily because of 
this precision about the objective , and the 
means to achieve that objective, that in 
1965-67 Indonesian Marxists were 
slaughtered and to date Marxism is banned 
altogether (whilst other ideologies, 
persecutions notwithstanding, are never 
proscribed) . The Muslims , at least as 
Hadjar paints them, are so vague beyond 
declaring slogans for an undefined 
"democracy" that I for one find it 
practically impossible to do anything 
positive but join in the chorus . Three 





1) A .R .T . Kemasang says that he needs 
a great deal more substance to accept my 
claim that democratic ideas are most likely 
to develop among Muslims . He is perfectly 
entitled to think so, but for the sake of 
intellectual honesty, the least he could 
have done before making that statement is 
a) to see Achmad Wahib's book (and to 
read it carefully) , and b) to meet Muslim 
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intellectuals from Indonesia (and discuss 
with them). 
2) "Only the Marxists have a clear-cut 
programme on how to achieve 
democracy" , says A.R.T . Kemasang. 
From a Marxist point of view, this 
statement is pure nonsense since it is the 
task of the bourgeoisie (namely the petty 
bourgeoisie) to carry on the democratic 
revolution. It does not mean that the 
working class in all circumstances has to 
wait until the bourgeoisie finishes its job 
before starting its own task , which is to 
achieve the social revolution . In certain 
conditions and/or at a certain moment in 
the history of a social formation, the 
working class has to include the task of the 
bourgeoisie into its own . In fact, I don 't see 
in the history of any social formation where 
the working class could avoid also 
shouldering that task. This is also the case 
with the Indonesian working class . 
Have the Marxists in Indonesia 
produced a clear-cut idea of how the 
working class should achieve this, or as I 
put it , participated in setting down 
milestones on the road to democracy? 
A.R.T . Kemasang answers by quoting the 
terrifying Stalinist dogma: "Only the 
Marxists have ... " He confirms in his own 





Militarisation and equipping ABRI 
The militarisation of 
state power 
Just before General Suharto went abroad on a state visit a short 
while ago, it was announced in Jakarta that military power was 
to be legalised in Indonesia .1 The report appeared in October 
1982 yet the domination of the military in Indonesian political 
and economic affairs has been a fact for many years. 
Military encroachments aimed at taking over state power first 
became evident in 19572 when foreign, in particular Dutch, 
companies were nationalised . Under the existing state of 
emergency which vested special powers in the Armed Forces 
(ABRI), these nationalised companies fell under military 
control, from the top management positions down to the 
branches . Mismanagement and corruption soon became rife. Far 
from leading to economic stability, developement and growth, 
nationalisation brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. 
This inevitably discredited the Sukarno government. 
In the civil administration, military appointees were placed 
side by side with pro"vincial governors and district heads, and 
occupied similar positions . Although the top positions may have 
been held by the civilians, in practice power was in the hands of 
the military . Furthermore, as a way of enhancing the military vis-
a-vis the trade union movement, associations of functionaries 
were set up which later, under the New Order, were transformed 
into a political party named Golkar. 
As the international situation , particularly in Southeast Asia, 
along with the situation in Indonesia in the 1960s became more 
tense, it was proposed that the Guided Democracy government 
should arm the workers and peasants . This suggestion was 
turned down on the grounds that ABRI consisted of the sons of 
workers and peasants which meant that if worker and peasant 
interests came under threat, ABRI would assuredly come to 
their defence . 
The political parties were not left out of this process of 
militarisation . Party members, in particular those leaders who 
occupied government posts, were given military uniforms and 
granted titular military rank . This happened even in the case of 
the Communist Party (PKI) which was actually the main obstacle 
to military rule . D . N. Aidit , the PKI Chairman who was a 
minister without portfolio, was given the rank of admiral. This, 
together. with the fact that a system of ideological co-existence, 
formulated as Nasakom,3 had been instituted should have meant 
that all political parties enjoyed equal opportunity in 
undertaking their political activities. The reality was rather 
different. In some provinces, the local military commands often 
halted the distribution of the PK I's daily , Harian Rakyat. In 
Java, the stronghold of feudalism, peasant actions for the 
implementation of land reform met with a great deal of 
obstruction from the military. 
The process of militarisation reached new heights with the 
30th September 1965 event. Six months later, ABRI 
consolidated its success by means of the 11th March Instruction 
(Supersemar), under which Sukarno handed over the powers and 
position of presidency to General Suharto. The day after the 
Supersemar , on 12th March 1966, the PKI and all organisations 
associated with it were declared illegal tl\roughout the country. 
With the reins of power now in Suharto's hands , the process 
of militarisation was greatly facilitated; consolidation and 
concentration of military power was greatly intensified in all 
aspects of life everywhere in Indonesia. As a result of the 30th 
September affair and the events before and after the 
Supersemar , it is estimated that about a million people were 
murdered. Hundreds of thousands more were thrown into prison 
or concentration camps and held for years without being charged 
by Hendrik Amahorseja 
or tried in court to prove their guilt . Comparing these events 
with the brutalities and genocide perpetrated under Hitler, the 
British philosopher Bertrand Russell . called it "the second 
biggest crime in our century". 
Not long before the 1982 general elections , an Indonesian 
lawyer named Sunardi made a call for General Suharto to be 
examined in conformity with the law , to prove his non-
involvement in the 30th September affair seventeen years ago. 
However, it was not Suharto who was brought to court ; the 
lawyer himself was tried and sentenced to a term in prison. (see 
T APOL Bulletin 50, March 1982, for the reasons for Sunardi's 
call.) 
Commenting recently on the 30th September affair, the 
Jakarta daily Merdeka made the following points : 
The destruction of the communist movement in Indonesia in 1965 
may possibly have been prompted by US intelligence circles and 
academics , but it didn't cost the USA a single dollar by contrast with 
the millions of dollars spent in other countries to wage war on and 
annihilate the communists . Crudely speaking, in the case of 
Indonesia , Washington can be said to have received the elimination 
of the PKI "on a platter" . This analysis is based on the political facts 
as they occurred. 
The benefits that have flowed since 1965 from the imposition of US 
influence in the economy and the commercial system , in mass 
communications , in higher education, culture , the sciences , social 
developments and particularly in defence and security , are striking 
evidence of the political gains enjoyed by America in Indonesia . This 
country has made enormous sacrifices in order to satisfy America , 
out of all proportion to the real benefits Indonesia has gained from 
the USA. 4 
After the adversaries of the military had been eliminated, the 
New Order came into existence laying down a whole new set of 
political and economic principles. These changes were extremely 
beneficial to foreign capital investment. In response to the new 
political and economic climate created by the military, Japan and 
a number of western countries immediately set up the Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) . In a collaboration 
which served the mutual interests of IGGI and the Suharto 
regime , foreign investments as well as economic aid flowed in 
from the IGGI member states , reinforcing the position of the 
military regime. 
One of the many generals to contribute towards the 
establishment of military power in Indonesia was General 
Nasution. Despite the significance of his contribution , he was 
defeated in the internal conflict within ABRI and was pushed 
into a position of little importance in Indonesian political life. 
After holding this position for a few years, he was pensioned off 
whilst his comrade-in-arms, General Suharto, continued to hold 
state power. Plans have now been made for Suharto to be 
crowned as "Father of Development"; a mausoleum has been 
built for him, located close to the tombs of the Javanese sultans 
in Central Java . Millions of dollars have been spent on this 
mausoleum. 
Military propaganda never stops proclaiming how beneficial 
the state ideology of Panca Sila is for the welfare of the people, 
but the reality is very different. The men in power practise a 
system of "mafia-ism": power and repression are used in order to 
make money for their own clique. The control of profitable 
resources is the main objective of the inner military clique 
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around Suharto . Within a short space of time after the 1965 
events, a number of top-ranking ABRI officers earning only a 
hundred or a hundred and fifty dollars a month had become very 
rich indeed . One western diplomat said of the president : 
Suharto has his fingers in every pie. He just makes commission from 
everything he can .. . s 
The Suharto family owns many businesses and has become one 
of the richest families in the country. 6 Yet , the vast majority of 
people live well below the poverty line and are becoming poorer 
and poorer . 
In order to tighten its grip on state power , the Suharto regime 
has formulated a number of military doctrines known as: Dwi-
Dharma ("the dual task") , Hankamrata ("overall defence and 
security") , ABRI Masuk Desa ("ABRI must go into the 
villages") and Dwi Fungsi ("dual function " or involvement in 
political as well as in defence affairs) . General Sumrahadi 
Partohadiputro, the ABRI spokesman in parliament, has said 
that the Dwi-Fungsi is necessary in order to prevent a coup 
d'etat. 7 
In both the lower and upper chambers (DPR and MPR), 
Golkar , the party which supports ABRI, has the majority of 
seats; in addition to this , Suharto appoints members of ABRI to 
sit in these two bodies. Thus , the military not only dominate the 
executive, they also play the decisive role in the two legislative 
bodies . The 1982 Defence Law defines ABRI's role as being "a 
social force, the force for dynamism and stability" (dinamisator 
dan stabilisator) . In such a situation , Suharto has no need of a 
magic wand to prolong his term of office as president. "It's just a 
question of pronouncing the decision", as General 
Amirmachmud , the chairman of the MPR and the DPR, has 
said.8 
******************* 
Equipping Suharto's Armed Forces 
In order to re-equip the Armed Forces , Indonesia has now 
become a leading customer of those western countries which 
have advanced industrial technology. In Asia, such countries as 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have become suppliers of 
military equipment to Indonesia . And although Indonesia has no 
diplomatic relations with Israel, it has nevertheless imported 
military hardware from that country . 9 
According to press reports , Mini"ster of Defence General 
Jusuf visited the USA last year specially for the purpose of 
buying howitzer rifles and torpedos; he also sought technical 
assistance for the maintenance of landing craft and other 
warships manufactured in the USA, as well as facilities for the 
repair of Indonesia's C-130 transport aircraft. Another purpose 
of the visit was to purchase sophisticated aircraft and air defence 
systems. 10 The range of weapons used by Suharto's Army 
include FAL, AR, AK-47 and M-16. As a member of ASEAN 
which has introduced standardisation of military equipment , the 
Indonesian Army now mainly uses the M-16. 
Army Equipment 
The Indonesian army consists of a force of about 200 ,000 men. 
The Mobile Brigade has 20,000 members and Civil Defence 
(Hansip) about 80,000. 
Of the Army's seventeen divisions, only three can be said to 
be well equipped. These are the three divisions located in Java: 
the Siliwangi Division (West Java), the Diponegoro Division 
(Central Java) and the Brawijaya Division (East Java). The 
Army has the following units : 
80 infantry battalions 
14 artillery battalions 
13 air defence battalions 
10 sapper battalions 
6 strategic command battalions 
4 cavalry battalions 
2 tank battalions. 
In military communications, there are three intelligence 
communication centres in Maras (30 kilometres south of 
Macassar) , Cijantung (East Jakarta) and Serang (West Java). 
The tank units are equipped with the following tanks and 











Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982 and vari.ous 
Indonesian newspapers. 
The Army's artillery and air defence weapons are listed in Table 
2 . A short while ago, it was announced that an Indonesian 
military delegation had arriveed in Sweden to investigate the 
possibility of purchasing Robot-70 type air defence . syst~ms 


















Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982. 
Apart from the aircraft and helicopters shown in Table 3, the 
Army also possesses a number of transport ships and Landing 
Craft Utilities . Last December, two LCUs under construction for 
the Army were launched in Tanjung Priok (Kaja Dock). These 
vessels are numbered 41 and 42; they are 32.80 metres long, 8.50 
metres wide with a speed of 10 knots. In the middle of 1982, the . 
Territorial Command received an additional 77 V-22 type high-
speed motor-boats with a carrying capacity each of 14 soldiers. 




1 International Herald Tribune, 4th October 1982. 
2 ISDA Journal , Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, 
Vol. XIV No. 1, September 1981. 
3 Nasakom: an acronym symbolising the collaboration between 
nationalist , religious and communist parties. 
4 Merdeka, 27th July , 1982. 
5 International Herald Tribune , 22nd December 1982. 
6 Vrij Nederland, 10th June 1978. See also Indonesia No. 25 (April), 
1978, Cornell University, USA. 
7 Sinar Harapan, 10th September 1982. 
8 Sinar Harapan, 5th October 1982. 
9 Pacific Defence Reporter , August 1982, page 33. From an independent 
source, TAPOL was informed in August 1980 that despite official 
disclaimers , the Indonesian Air Force had started to take delivery of 
16 former Israeli airforce A-4E Skyhawk fighter bombers , costing $25 
million . The planes were refurbished by Israel Aircraft Industries , 
Lod, near Tel Aviv , and shipped to Indonesia as though they came 
from the USA. The source added that the aircraft were clearly 
identifiable as being former Israeli planes by an extended jet pipe 
designed to reduce their infra-red "signatures" and thus baffle surface-
to-air missiles; only Israeli A-4E aircraft have this particular feature. 
10 Merdeka, 28th July , 1982. 
11 Arbetaren, 19th November 1982. 
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Law, Propaganda Julie Southwood 
and 'R!rror Patrick Flanagan 
Chapter L .. America's Lynchpin", situates Suharto's ew Or er 10 1 s 10 ernat1onal, 
political-economic setting. with special emphasis on US inte rests in Indonesia since the 
turn of the century. 
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the Dominators in the New Order and their sub-sets: 
the Suharto Group (Suharto and his advisors); the Security-Intelligence Group ; the Army 
Group and the Finance Group. 
Chapter 3, "New Order Violence", analyses the use of propaganda as a form of terror , 
su1TR11arises the events leading up to October 1965 and provides an account of the 1965/66 
and subsequent massacres. 
Chapter 4 provides what Professor Wertheim calls "the first attempt to describe the actual 
power of KOPKAMTIB in its full impact upon the behaviour of both Indonesian 
officialdom and the general public", with sections on its control of the Press, Education, 
Religious Institutions and the Workplace . 
Chapter 5 examines the role of KOPKAMTIB and the legal system in the process of 
victimisation, and deals with Classification, Arrest, Interrogation, Legal Aid, Trial, 
Sentence, Punishment and Release. 
Chapter 6 deals with the use of laws by the Suharto regime in the consolidation of its 
power, and also examines transcripts of a number of political trials . 
Chapter 7 looks into the techniques of injustice; the use of Indonesia's legal heritage , the 
Anti-Subversion Law , management of the law and the courts, the use of the death 
sentence, and provides detailed figures on the trial and sentencing of "G30S/PKI" 
political prisoners . 
Chapter 8 deals with the Fetish of Law. 
Chapter 9, "Students, Subversion and Insult ", gives a history of student dissent in post-
1965 Indonesia. It also gives a brief account of the New Order's Muslim critics. 
Chapter 10 on the "Limits of Resistance", examines the prospects for basic change, 
through offensive and defensive action. 
A number of important documents are appended. 
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